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NOTE AND COMMENT 911
I:NTERNATIONAL. AsI'r.cs oF PRIOHIBITION Exr.'acmtEN.-The Eighteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution prohibits "the manufacture, sale, or
transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into,
or the exportation thereof from the' United States and all territory subject
to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes.* 4o Stat. io5O, 1941. In
the National Prohibition Cases. 253 U. S. 350, 386, the amendment was said
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to be operative "throughout the entire territorial limits of the United States."
As originally enacted, the National Prohibition Act did not in terms define
its territorial field, but a supplemental provision afterwards enacted declares
that the act "shall apply not only to the United States but to all territory
subject to its jurisdiction." 42 Stat. 222. In other words, its field expressly
coincides with that of the Amendment.
With the territorial field of national prohibition thus broadly defined,
it has become necessary, in cases having rather important international com-
plications, to determine what implied exceptions, if any, the courts may be
justified in reading into amendment and statute in order to reconcile national
prohibition with some of the customary incidents of friendly international
intercourse. In the cases presented to date, the argument for implied excep-
tions has been conspicuously unsuccessful.
In Grogan v. Walker & Sons and Anchor Line v. Aldridge, decided
together, 259 U. S. 8o, the Supreme Court held, in the one case, that not-
withstanding prior statutory or treaty provisions to the contrary it is no
longer permissible to ship intoxicating liquor in bond from Canada via
Detroit to Mexico, and in the other case that liquor in transit from Scotland
to Bermuda cannot be trans-shipped from one British ship to another in
New York harbor. Mr. Justice Holmes said: "The routine arguments are
pressed that this country does not undertake to regulate the habits of people
elsewhere and that the references to beverage purposes and use as a beverage
show that it was not attempting to do so; that it has no interest in med-
dling with transportation across its territory if leakage in transit is prevented,
as it has been; that the repeal of statutes and a fortiori of treaties by impli-
cation is not to be favored; and that even if the letter of a law seems to
have that effect a thing may be within the letter yet not within the law
when it has been construed. We appreciate all this, but are of opinion that
the letter is too strong in this case." And he continued: "The Eighteenth
Amendment meant a great revolution in the policy of this country, and pre-
sumably and obviously meant to upset a good many things on as well as
off the statute book. It did not confine itself in any meticulous way to the
use of intoxicants in this country. It forbade export for beverage purposes
elsewhere. * * * It is obvious that those whose wishes and opinions were
embodied in the amendment meant to stop the whole business." 259 U. S.
8o,4
Following the decisions in Grogan v. Walker & Sons and Anchor Line
v. Aldridge, the Attorney General gave an opinion that it had been made
unlawful to possess, transport, or sell intoxicating liquors for beverage pur-
poses (i) on United States ships outside United States territorial waters
and (2) on foreign ships inside United States territorial waters. In the
Attorney General's view, United States ships on the high seas were com-
prehended in the phrase, "the United States and all territory subject to the
jurisdiction thereof," while the sweeping construction given the Amendment
and the Act in the Grogan and Anchor Line cases necessarily precluded any
implied exceptions in favor of foreign ships. Attorney, General's Opinion,
Oct. 6, 1922.
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The Attorney General's construction was promptly contested by the
shipping companies. It was sustained, however, by Judge Learned Hand in
International Mercantile Marine v. Stuart, 285 Fed. 79, as regards United
States ships outside United States territorial waters, and by the same judge
in Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 284 Fed. 89o, as regards foreign ships inside
United States territorial waters. It was urged in the latter case that intoxi-
cating liquor as part of the ship's stores of a foreign merchant vessel was
not within the rule, but the court denied the contention. It was a question,
said Judge Learned Hand, of "implied limitations upon words which literally
in any event cover the case." And after the decisions in the Grogan and
Anchor Line cases, in which there were "much stronger reasons to imply
an exception from the literal language of the act," he felt constrained to
hold against the limitation for which the foreign shipping companies con-
tended.
The district court's decision as regards United States ships outside
United States territorial waters has recently been reversed by the Supreme
Court, while its decision as regards foreign ships has been affirmed. Cunard
Steamship Co. et al. v. Mellon, decided April 3o, 1923. Until Congress has
legislated more specifically, United States vessels may transport and sell
intoxicating liquors on the high seas and in foreign waters. But foreign
merchant vessels may not bring liquors for beverage purposes within the
three-mile limit, not even as 
part of the ship's stores.
The cases presented to the Supreme Court called only for a constructipn
of the terms in which the Amendment and the Act define the territorial field
of prohibition. Those terms, it has already been indicated, are very simple
and very explicit. In each instance the court attributed to them their natural
and literal meaning.
As regards United States ships outside United States territorial waters,
there appears to have been no substantial reason for construing the terms
otherwise. The field of prohibition is expressly defined as the United States
and territory subject to its jurisdiction. It is only in a metaphorical sense
that a ship is ever said to be a floating bit of territory of the state whose
flag it flies. See Scharrenberg v. Dollar S. S. Co., 245 U. S. 122; MOORE,
DIGEST, I, § 174. The term "territory" in the Amendment and the Act means,
said Mr. Justice Vat/ Devanter, delivering the opinion of the court, "the
regional areas-of land and adjacent waters-over which the United States
claims and exercises dominion and control as a sovereign power." The
term is used in a physical and not a metaphorical sense.
As regards foreign merchant ships within United States territorial
waters, on the other hand, a very persuasive argument was made in favor
of an implied exception. The argument was admirably epitomized in a dis-
senting opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland. In the first place, it was said,
"the general rule of international law is that a foreign ship is so far idcn-
tified with the country to which it belongs that its internal affairs, whose
effect is confined to the ship, ordinarily are not subjected to interference at
the hands of another state in whose ports it is temporarily present.' See
Wlildcnhus's Case, 120 U. S. I, 12 (scinble) ; United States v. Rogers, 15o
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U. S. 249; 260 (seMble); CHARTERIS, BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATJONAL
LAW, 1920-21, page 45; WRIGHT, 7 MINN. L. REv. 28, 32; GREGORy, 2 MIcH.
L. Rev. 333, 347; ScoTT, RESOLUTIONS OF THE INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, x43; HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, I, §§ 221 ff. In the second place, in thewords of Chief Justice Marshall, in The Charming Betsy, 2 Cr. 64, ii8, "anact of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, ifany other possible construction remains." See WRIGHT, Op. cit., 30-32. Mr.
Justice Sutherland concluded as follows: "interference with the purelyinternal affairs of a foreign ship is of so delicate a nature, so full of possi-bilities of international misunderstandings, and so likely to invite retaliationthat an affirmative conclusion in respect thereof should rest upon nothingless than the clearly expressed intention of Congress to that effect, and thisI am unakle to find in the legislation here under review." See Brown v.Duchesne, 19 How. 183. Compare Caldwell v. Vanvlissingen, 9 Hare, 415.
But see Act i5 and i6 Vict., ch. 83, § 26.
Cogent as Mr. Justice Sutherland's argument must be admitted to be,there would seem to be an even more persuasive answer. When the inten-tion of Congress has been expressed as clearly and unequivocally as it is in the
National Prohibition Act, and when Congress has made express exceptionswhere exceptions were intended (see Title III, § 2 , excepting "liquor in transitthrough the Panama Canal or on the Panama Railroad," 41 Stat. 322), it must
be conceded that the courts ought to proceed slowly in creating implied excep-tions by construction. Implied exceptions would undoubtedly be justified ifrequired to insure the proper immunities of foreign diplomats (see WtIGHT,
op cit., 31) or the immunities of public ships. The Exchange, 7 Cr. xi6.But the foreign merchant ship presents by no means so strong a case. Itmay be questioned, indeed, whether the regulation of intoxicating liquorsin the stores of a foreign merchant ship is in any real sense analogous to
the regulation of those matters of discipline and internal order with respectto which the territorial authority generally refrains from exercising juris-
diction. There would seem to be a much closer analogy between the inhibi-tion of intoxicating liquor and some of the multifarious police regulations,port and harbor regulations, quarantine regulations, customs regulations,
regulations in respect to loading, regulations in respect to life-saving appli-
ances, or regulations in respect to the employment and compensation ofcrews to which merchant ships are commonly subject in foreign ports.
While the decision in Cunard Steamship Co. v. Mellon seems soundenough, the majority opinion, unfortunately, is based upon an arbitrary anduntenable premise. It is asserted that foreign merchant ships entering ourterritorial waters become absolutely subject to the territorial jurisdiction,and a dictum is quoted from The Exchange, supra, which, as an assertion
of absolute sovereignty, would have filled with envy the foremost apologistfor seventeenth century absolutism. Chief Justice Marshall made the state-ment quoted, it should be said, in no such spirit. In the context from whichthe passage is take, it will be found to be no more than a step in theprocess of reasoning by which he elaborated a consensual theory of cus-tomary international law. This, however, the court ignores. And the court
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indicates that the premise of territorial absolutism has found support in
numerous cases, none of which, as a matter of fact, are strictly in point.
Thus, United States v. Diekelman, 92 U. S. 520, was a case arising in a port
under military control, in which clearance was withheld until alleged con-
traband had been unloaded. The reference to Wildenhus's Case, supra, is
unfortunately to only a part of Chief Justice Waite's dictum. Nishimura
Ekiu v. United States, 142 U. S. 651, involved the power to exclude aliens.
Knott v. Botany Mills, 179 U. S. 69, involved the application of Section i
of the Hater Act, nullifying stipulations against liability for negligence,
to a foreign vessel on a voyage from a foreign port to a port in the United
States. Patterson v. Bark Eudora, i9o U. S. i6g, and Strathearn S. S. Co.
v. Dillon, 252 U. S. 348, were cases in which the statute in question stipu-
lated expressly that it should apply to foreign vessels. Compare Sandberg
v. McDonald, 248 U. S. z85, and Neilson v. Rhine Shipping Co., 248 U. S.
205. From such a premise, of course, the court experiences no difficulty in
proceeding to the conclusion that the Amendment and Act were intended to
apply to foreign ships in United States waters. It seems unfortunate, at
this day, that the decision of a case having important international compli-
cations should have been thus supported.
Of the numerous international complications which have arisen out of
prohibition enforcement, it may be added, the one which is in many respects
the most interesting and most important still awaits a final determination.
The writer refers to the question of seizures of foreign ships outside the
three-mile limit. See The Grace and Ruby, 283 Fed. 475; United States v.
z,25o Cases of Liquor, 286 Fed. 26o. E. D. D.
